Introduction
Scots lawyers have always been fond of claiming that their system is one derived from principle rather than practice, that it has developed through the intellectual thought of our writers rather than through the piecemeal and arbitrary evolution of rules that is a defining characteristic of the common law. We tend to see ourselves as part of the civilian tradition, having received Roman law, or at least Roman-Dutch law, at the most crucial stage in the development of our modern legal system, that is to say the period between the Reformation and the Enlightenment. This reception was effected through the systematisation of Scots law achieved by the Institutional writers, who drew heavily on their Roman-Dutch training, rather than by the courts through case law. Yet notwithstanding that claimed love of principle, the treatment of one of Roman law's most significant contributions to legal thought, the actio iniuriarum, which was a central feature of the Scottish law of obligations during the Institutional period, was cavalier and even negligent throughout the 19 th , and for much of the 20 th , centuries. It is only latterly that Scottish commentators, and even on occasion Scottish courts, are rediscovering our historical roots and we see once again the actio iniuriarum being called into aid -both as a means of achieving an appropriate result in particular cases, and as a means by which we can understand the structural underpinning of our law of obligations. This striking ambivalence towards the actio iniuriarum is probably explained by changing political imperatives.
The Enlightenment Scots, Unionist to a man, exhibited a clear desire to associate themselves with the English and so participate in that great 18 th and 19 th century adventure, the British Empire; but as that Empire recedes into history, legal nationalism reasserts itself once again by seeking a reconnection with our Romanist roots.
However that may be, Scottish judges and legal commentators are today comfortable once again in using concepts derived from Roman law to tackle new legal problems, but of course nowadays we also have other tools to drive the development of the law, none more important than the European Convention on Human Rights. This has had a profound effect on the development of the law of delict, both in the fields of personal injury 1 and of course privacy. 2 So the underlying question that I want to explore here is whether, in the modern world, Scots law gains anything by reactivating its long-neglected roots, over and above the tools that it unquestionably has. Would we be better striking out in a new direction, connecting with the new ius commune of European Human Rights law, instead of rediscovering, reviving, and seeking to apply the principles underpinning the actio iniuriarum?
Should we regard it as no more than a romantic Romanism, useful for emphasising our difference from English law, or use it as an active driver of the development of our law in the modern world? It can be the latter only if it is able to serve some purpose other than or better than any other existing legal tool.
Characteristics of the actio iniuriarum in Scots law
It was during the Institutional period that the actio iniuriarum was directly received into our law and 'injury', in its specialised Roman sense, became understood to be an actionable wrong in Scotland. Stair, 3 though he lists a number of the interests that the law of Scotland protects, and talks of a general obediential obligation of reparation, does not mention injury as a separate wrong and it is left to Bankton, as always the most accessible of the Scottish Institutional writers, to give it unequivocal recognition. He talks of 'injury' as a wrong independent of any other though it is clear that he is finding this wrong in an anglicised 'iniuria', as something that is suffered, even although to the jurists of the ius commune that word more usually meant 'wrongfulness' as a judgment rather than injury as a loss. 4 'Injury' (as a loss) was almost, but not quite, synonymous with insult, that is to say an injury to dignity: it was an attack on a person's honour, dignity or status. 5 Now this was a 'high-level principle', to use the words of Lord Hoffmann in Wainwright v Home Office, 6 which of course as an analytical tool he rejected as being of no value to the development of the law. That rejection, however, reflects a peculiarly English mindset which has far less purchase in Scotland, for Scottish lawyers have never had a structural distrust for high-level principles from which we might extract particular rules of liability. 7 The phrase actio iniuriarum was able, therefore, to serve as a useful shorthand to mean an action raised in response to an attack on one of the interests protected by, and prohibited under, the concept of iniuria, or injury. Injury, in this sense, had at least three defining characteristics.
(i) Affront
The first question is what interests were protected by the actio iniuriarum, so that their infringement gave rise to liability? Stair listed the interests that Scots law 4 The ambiguity remains between injury as a loss and injury as an action. The maxim volenti non fit iniuria might be translated either as a defence that negatives loss or as a defence that negatives wrongfulness. The traditional formulation of a claim for damages in a Scottish court narrates that the pursuer has suffered 'loss, injury or damage'. Yet, in the phrase damnum iniuria datum, or damage wrongfully caused, iniuria unambiguously means wrongfulness, and this was the primary meaning Bankton gave it when he described injury as being committed 'either by Facts, as beating, or other attrocious usage of one's person; by Words, reproachful and slanderous, so far as they infer a damage to the state of the person or wound his character; by Consent, in giving warrant, command or authority to commit the injury; or by Writing, as by composing infamous libels and satires to one's disgrace': Institute 1, 10, 21.
5
'Injury according to Stair, Bankton, Erskine and other writers on the law of Scotland, who in that respect adopt the language of the civil law, "is an offence maliciously committed to the reproach and grievance of another, whereby his fame, dignity or reputation is hurt"': Newton v Fleming (1846) 8 D 677 (Lord Murray) , p.694. Stair's 'general obediential obligation', for example, is clearly a 'high-level principle' of a nature dismissed by Lord Hoffmann.
protected 8 without explicitly tracing any of them to the general wrong of iniuria but, following the Roman law more closely, Bankton 9 clearly envisaged a general wrong of which Stair's interests are merely examples. He made it clear that real injury included physical assault (if without using that precise term), 10 but revealingly the loss for which a monetary redress was due was less physical than emotional, and this gives us our first, and perhaps most important, defining characteristic of the action: damages were not awarded because the pursuer had suffered physical injury 11 but because he had suffered emotional disturbance. 12 It was the affront at the insult to his honour that demanded redress rather than the corporeal effects on the pursuer of the wrongful act. The protected interest was honour, or dignitas, and the loss suffered through its infringement was affront. 13 Given the very incorporeality of such a loss, compensatory damages were not appropriate, for no true (commercial) value can be placed on affront, and instead monetary redress in the form of solatium was the appropriate remedy (remembering that punitive or exemplary damages have no place in the law of Scotland). A solatium acted both as a solace to the affronted victim and an acknowledgement by the law that a wrong had been committed (iniuria, in the wider sense of wrongfulness).
Other infringements of interests that came within this high-level principle included wrongful imprisonment, defamation, and interference with family relationships: in all of these it was the element of affront that was the loss attracting monetary redress, and for this 8 1, 9, 4. 13 In Roman law an attack on dignitas was likely thought wrongful because of its potential to distrupt the stability of a highly stratified society, but in Scotland the loss always was a more personal affront.
reason many of the modern forms of liability traced to the actio iniuriarum may conveniently be referred to as the 'affront-based delicts'. 14 
(ii) Intent
The second definitional characteristic of iniuria concerns the nature of fault (or wrongfulness) that it was (or is) necessary for a pursuer to establish. Now to a large extent this is explained by the jurisdictional rules of the Scottish courts in the Institutional period. Insofar as it concerned dignitas, that is to say the place of a person in society (the person's honour, dignity and status), 'injury' jurisdictionally belonged to the Commissary court, which had taken over the Consistorial jurisdiction of the Courts of the Official (the papal courts) at the Reformation. 15 With those injuries that led to death or physical harm, the Justiciary Court had jurisdiction.
There was some overlap between the Commissary and the criminal court, and even between these courts and the civil courts, but the remaining dividing lines were removed entirely when the Court of Session took over jurisdiction for all delictual (as opposed to criminal) liability, which it had done by 1830. 16 The flavour of criminality remained, however, even when redress for the wrong was sought only in the civil courts, and this fact, together with the historical influence of the church courts which focused on matters of conscience, meant that the nature of fault with iniuria in Scotland was always intent. It follows that the affront-based delicts were and are intentional delicts. As the Court of Session put it in 1765:
An actio iniuriarum, where there is no patrimonial loss, and where the damages awarded are only in solatium, must be founded upon dolus malus, according to the opinions of all writers upon law; and so far it differs from damages awarded to repair patrimonial loss, in which it is sufficient to specify even culpa levissima. 17 This remains the case today and it is this fact that justifies recovery for a wider range of losses than is possible with aquilian liability. Negligence, or the unintentional causing of injury, does not found liability for mere mental disturbance unless that disturbance amounts to a recognised psychiatric illness, but the matter is very different when the harm has been caused intentionally. 18 While it is good social policy to accept that distress and upset are part and parcel of life itself and therefore have to be borne without redress, it is also good legal policy to discourage people from acting with the intention of causing such upset. 19 Remember that solatium not only provides a solace but it also acts as an acknowledgement that some legal wrong has been committed and so it is peculiarly appropriate that redress should be available for intentional wrongfulness, even when that does not lead to physical and quantifiable loss, injury or damage.
We need to be clear, however, as to the exact nature of 'intent' that is necessary to found liability. It would seem that there is no requirement to intend to cause emotional distress and that it is sufficient for liability that the defender intended to do the wrongful act. 20 However, because this rather contradicts the policy basis that justifies recognising liability for affront in the first place (discouraging people from acting in a manner designed to cause affront), something additional to the intent to do the act is necessary before liability is established. In English law 21 this additional element is the concept of imputed malice. Intentionally doing an act that leads to an unintended (or, perhaps better, a non-intended) injury may impute 'malice' in the English sense. 22 But Scots law seems to take a different approach to justify imposing liability on someone for an intentional act when they did not specifically intend the harmful result of the act. Scots law betrays very clearly its civilian roots here, for it imposes liability for harmful consequences when there is no lawful justification for doing the intentional act. 23 Wrongfulness is found not in the intention to do an act which injures, but in the intention to do an injurious act without having lawful authority to do it. This has long been the justification for giving damages for assault, in the sense of physical touching without the lawful authority of consent 24 and the same thinking can be seen in quite different aspects of the law of obligations, such as unjustified enrichment, where it is now clear that enrichments will be reversed where there is no legal authority to keep the enrichment. 25 We see this again in real injury cases such as wrongful imprisonment and wrongful prosecution where fault is typically found in 'malice and want of probable cause'.
Affront is therefore not enough to found liability under the actio iniuriarum in Scotland: it must be affront caused by an intentional act done without lawful justification, and it is for the pursuer to aver and show this lack of lawful justification. Affront was the basis of iniuria in Roman law as it is in Scots law; intent was part of the Roman law too, if only by default since the distinction between intent, recklessness and negligence was never truly drawn by the Romans. The third defining characteristic of the Scots law of iniuria is also taken directly from Roman law: 26 this is the structural distinction that we make between real injuries and verbal injuries. Now, it is a common mistake to interpret this as referring to the losses suffered (using 'injury' in its sense of loss rather than its sense of wrongfulness). In fact, the distinction is between the methods of causing the loss. Real injuries are injuries caused by physical acts (subdivided into wrongs such as assault, mutilation, killing and rape) while verbal injuries are those caused by the use of words (originally this class was not subdivided, but it later became divided into defamation and other verbal injuries 27 ). The legal distinction between these two categories in Scotland was, however, jurisdictional rather than substantive, with the Justiciary Court dealing with real injuries (in both the criminal and the civil sense) and the Commissary Court dealing with verbal injuries. 28 However, once jurisdiction had been transferred from both of these courts to the civil courts, 29 the continuing relevance of the distinction becomes open to question, except insofar as it indicates a factual difference with wrongful imprisonment (for example) being a real injury because it is effected by physical acts, and defamation being a verbal injury because it is effected by words.
(iii) Real and verbal injuries
In truth it was never a particularly helpful distinction even in a classificatory sense because it is easy to imagine cases in which it is difficult or impossible to say whether it is physical acts or words that have caused the loss. Century, negligence was ubiquitous by the end. Yet the modern ubiquity of the action for negligence obscures to our contemporary eyes the exceptionality of a legal remedy pronounced against an individual who did not intend to cause any harm.
Liability in negligence lends itself well to losses of a physical nature, patrimonial in the case of damage to property and personal in the case of damage to human body or mind, and it does have a deontological attractiveness in its provision of redress against persons who neglected to do what they ought to have done. But affront is not and never has been a justifiable human reaction to unintended acts. We are affronted at insult not because of its effect but because of the intent with which it is done. Our dignity is not -cannot be -harmed by accident, but by the knowledge (or ourselves, and of others) that there has been a deliberate effort to undermine it. We may feel emotional distress at accidental injury, but that distress cannot truly be characterised as affront, which is properly a reaction to a deliberate assault on one's sense of worth.
The second 19 th Century development was that in Scottish court practice the very phrase 'actio iniuriarum' began to be misused, and it took on a meaning that none of the Institutional writers, nor the civilian writers of the ius commune, would ever have 30 In Continental Tyre Group Ltd v Robertson 2011 GWD 14-321 (Sheriff Principal Bowen) it was held that it mattered little whether the claim was one for defamation or for verbal injury: but that was in the context of the remedy of interdict, where all that is necessary to show is a legal wrong (as opposed to the particular legal wrong). The opportunity was, thereby, lost to examine the parameters of verbal injury (in that case as an economic, as opposed to personality, loss).
given it. Perhaps because aquilian liability, as manifested in the action for negligence, expanded from patrimonial to all physical losses, including bodily injury, the word 'injury' came to be used in a far wider sense than Bankton had used it: the word became, and indeed remains, the denominator of a central aspect of the law of However, the crucial effect of seeing bereavement awards as the major application of the actio iniuriarum was that it shifted the focus of the loss away from affront to dignity, and towards hurt to feelings. Emotional distress, upset and sadness are the natural consequences of bereavement in the way that affront, or insult, or the taking of offence, is not. This opened the way for the actio iniuriarum to expand its parameters beyond insult and towards hurt feelings, and it is this that gives the action its potential in the modern age.
The third crucial development in the 19 th Century was the response of the law to a hardening of the rules applicable to the wrong of defamation. This was and is in
Scotland an archetypical affront-based delict, even if there was always the possibility of claiming for patrimonial loss caused through damage to the economic worth of one's reputation in the same action. 37 That affront founds the action explains why, unlike in English law, it has always been possible in Scotland to sue for defamation even if no-one other than the pursuer hears the words used by the defender -there is no need for 'communication' in the English sense. 38 However, after some decades of doubt, it was conclusively settled in 1859 that truth is an absolute defence to an action for defamation. 39 In itself a perfectly sound rule 40 -even with a civilian conception of defamation being an iniuria, or an affront to dignity 41 , on the basis that a person has no business being affronted by having his true character revealed -the rule nevertheless seems right away to have been assumed to apply to all injuries 40 See Descheemaeker (n 39). His argument, alluded to in the article's very title, is that in English law defamation is by definition false because the interest being protected is deserved reputation. 41 Putting it at its simplest, the Scottish approach to defamation is that it protects dignitas, the third of Ulpian's bases of iniuria, before fama, which was the second: D. 47, 10, 1, 2.
caused through words and not only the form of verbal injury that we call defamation.
So other types of verbal injury took on truth as an absolute defence even when they are non-defamatory. But since it is defamatoriness that justifies the court in presuming falsity (so that truth in defamation is properly a defence for the defender to prove), in non-defamatory cases of verbal injury falsity became part of the definition of the wrong (and so for the pursuer to prove). 42 46 Bankton included within defamation cases where a person charged the pursuer 'with a foul disease, whereby his character is blemished': I, 10, 24. Erskine, however, explicitly held it wrongful even when 'the infirmities of that sort imply no real reproach, either in themselves or in the just opinion of mankind': IV, 4, 80.
socially unmentionable impotency) 47 is clearly a matter of informational privacy, and its breach may well be a civil wrong, yet again it is constantly cited in the literature as an example of defamation. 48 In reality, both of these are affront-based verbal injuries that have been sucked into defamation when the category of non-defamatory verbal injury was squeezed almost out of existence.
The residual category of non-defamatory verbal injury was effectively limited to what we call the public hatred, contempt and ridicule cases 49 (or, again following Ulpian, 50 convicium). Yet even here from the 19 th Century the law focused on truth and falsity, which hardly arises and explains why so few public hatred cases are successfuland those that are 51 are really actions for defamation argued a slightly peculiar way.
There is some evidence that more recently the Scottish courts are beginning to refocus their enquiry in this direction. 52 If, however, truth as a defence is limited (as it should be) to the action based on lie-mongering (defamation) then the actio iniuriarum can much more comfortably be utilised to provide redress for hurt feelings when the truth is being broadcast in a way that has no legal justification. 53 [2003] UKHL 53. 54 [1897] 2 QB 57. Here the defendant had intended to do the act but not to cause the injury, but damages were still awarded on the theory of imputed intention (doing such a dangerous act imputes an intention to cause the harm that directly arises from it). In Wainwright Lord Hoffman said that 'imputed intention will not do' for
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That English case may be compared with a similar Scottish decision, Henderson v
Chief Constable of Fife, 55 where a woman who had been arrested during the course of an industrial dispute was required, on being placed in a police cell, to remove her bra. Now, this was a correct application of police procedure (unlike, be it noted, the strip-search in Wainwright) but nevertheless Lord Jauncey in the Outer House of the Court of Session (in one of his last judgments there before his elevation to the House of Lords) held that the unthinking and unjustifiable application of police procedure when it was unnecessary (for there was no possibility of this woman being a suicide risk, or using her bra to attack policemen) amounted to a wrong for which damages could be claimed. He made no explicit mention of the actio iniuriarum but the wrong suffered was clearly an affront:
I consider that Mrs Henderson has established that the request to remove her brassiere was an interference with her liberty which was not justified in law, from which it follows that she has a remedy in damages ... I consider that a figure of £300
would fairly reflect the invasion of privacy and liberty which Mrs Henderson suffered as a result of having to remove her brassiere. 56 Now, in neither Wainwright nor Henderson was there any deliberate intent on the part of the police or prison service to humiliate or affront anyone and while that was enough to bring the case to an end in England, it was not enough in Scotland: in the English case fault was required to be found in direct intent to inflict emotional harm (which did not exist) while in the Scottish case fault was located in the lack of legal justification for the actions which caused the affront. Following correct procedure was not in itself a justification.
We again see fault being constructed as lack of legal justification for the act in question in the Scottish post-mortem cases. 57 In each of these three cases, decided in the early years of the 20 th century, the bodies of deceased persons had been injuries short of psychiatric illness, such as affront. 'The defendant must actually have acted in a way which he knew to be unjustifiable and either intended to cause harm or at least acted without caring whether he caused harm or not interfered with for medical reasons without the knowledge or consent of the deceased's relatives, and while the discussion of actionability was for the most part obiter, the judges in each were willing to contemplate that damages might be awarded to the relatives for the distress that they suffered. They belong to the same group of cases as Henderson, since it was the lack of legal authority to act that rendered the post-mortems actionable. Whitty has argued, persuasively, that the only explanation for these cases is that the remedy applicable was solatium for affront which derives directly from the actio iniuriarum. The matter was discussed in a more modern case, and one that provides the most direct affirmation of the continuing authority in 21 st century Scotland of the actio iniuriarum. In Stevens v Yorkhill NHS Trust 60 an action for damages was raised by a bereaved mother against a health board who had removed and retained the organs of her deceased baby child without her knowledge or consent. The action was explicitly based upon the mother's right not to be exposed to injury to her emotional health. The defence was that there was no doctor-patient relationship between the hospital and the mother such as would give rise to a duty of care. The temporary judge held that that defence might have been appropriate in an action for negligence, traced to the lex aquilia, but the claim at hand was in contrast one traced to the actio iniuriarum. He held that Scots law recognised as a legal wrong, for which damages by way of solatium could be claimed, the unauthorised removal and retention of organs from a dead body. It was the judge's view that the earlier post-mortem cases were not explained as an extended application of assythment (the native Scottish remedy for wrongfully inflicted death) 61 but as an aspect of the actio iniuriarum, in particular because the damage being sued upon was the emotional distress suffered by the pursuers. Again, actionability is clearly founded on the lack of legal authority to do the act. 62
Stevens protecting the family relationship as in itself a value, recognised more than one victim to rape. When a married woman was raped, the actio iniuriarum gave the husband a claim: 66 in Walker's words,
It is also a wrong to her husband, justifying an actio iniuriarum at his instance; the wrong consists in the gross affront to the husband, the hurt to his feelings, the violation of the husband's right to the exclusive possession of his wife's person, and the dishonour done to his marriage-bed by the other man. 67 It is difficult to believe that such an action would succeed, on this basis, today. The state has an obligation under the European Convention on Human Rights to protect citizens from sexual attack 68 but that obligation is amply fulfilled through the criminal law, and an argument that there is something missing with the lack of civil remedy available to the husband of a rape victim will get nowhere under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 69 We simply do not see the husband and wife relationship today in terms that would found any action based on his affront at her rape (however real his emotional distress might be and however clearly there is a lack of legal justification for the act).
Adultery too was an actionable wrong 70 because it was an affront against the husband's honour (though not, revealingly, the wife's). 71 Again, the abolition of that action 72 At a broader level, it also seems to me that the very concept of 'honour' as a personal interest needs to be regarded with deep suspicion. In a society with virtually unanimity in its moral outlook (which is, surely, a hugely unattractive society) it might be possible to regard an attack on a person's honour as an 'injury', but today honour is an entirely self-defined notion with no generally accepted social content.
Putting it at its most benign, 'honour' is characterised by pomposity and self-regard; 74 Other wrongs against family relationships have been recognised by the law of Scotland. Plagium, or childstealing, might well have been regarded in the Institutional period as a real injury, but it has survived only in its criminal aspects today. Damages do not lie in negligence for wrongful interference with the parent-child relationship (McKeen v Chief Constable, Lothian and Borders Police 1994 SLT 93) and, even if this is done with intent, it is difficult today to accept that the real harm done when one's child is kidnapped is an affront to one's dignity.
at its most malign, we are too distressingly used to hearing about 'honour killings' and the like to be much attracted to 'honour' as a legally protected interest. Some men probably are genuinely affronted by their sisters and daughters wanting to lead a life of social and sexual freedom, and their sense of religious duty might well compel them to attempt to force their wills upon their sisters and daughters by harsh physical means, but the modern law cannot give any value to 'honour' in this sense.
Nor is there much attraction in expanding liability for hurt feelings beyond the narrow bounds set for it in negligence and the long-established, but ultimately peculiar, 76 claim for bereavement awards. However, it may be that hurt feelings combined with a social necessity for the law to give some recognition that a wrong has been committed is (just) enough to allow for the recognition of a claim based on breach of informational privacy, which is clearly an interest that is gaining in importance -but
has not yet been fully accepted -in the modern world. 77 Niall Whitty 78 has argued that the most obvious use of iniuria in the modern world is to provide a remedy for breach of personal privacy and he argues, surely rightly, that it would be far better to develop the law in this way than to require pursuers to attempt to squeeze breach of privacy into another action like defamation, breach of confidence or even breach of copyright 79 . The danger, as always, is that policy considerations applicable to one action might be inappropriately applied to the other action. What Whitty does not do, however, is to explain why it is better to use the traditional concept of injury rather than other, more contemporary, sources of privacy rights as the driver of this potential legal development. Elspeth Reid is doubtful whether an expanded concept of iniuria would really serve this purpose and she is much more attracted to the idea of using the European Convention on Human Rights 76 The true explanation for bereavement awards is that they serve the valuable policy purpose of ensuring that causing death is not cheaper to the wrongdoer than causing injury. No other general principle can be extracted, it is submitted, from the existence of bereavement awards. to drive the development of the law of privacy. 80 Her primary argument is that modern concerns, in particular informational privacy, can only be effectively protected if liability extends beyond intentional infringement. 81 This may well be true, but given that the true basis of liability in Scotland is lack of legal justification for doing the intentional act, the criticism does not really explain why the actio iniuriarum should not be used in addition to, or as foundational of rights developed in light of, the ECHR. The question in Von Hannover v Germany 82 or even in Mosley v News Group Newspapers 83 can as easily be structured as whether the newspapers had any legal justification for printing the stories about the celebrated personages in these cases. The answer to such a question would invariably require an assessment of the value of the right to free speech and whether that is truly interfered with by prohibiting publication -a similar analysis to that required under the European Convention. So I am not convinced that we face a stark choice, between looking back to the actio iniuriarum or looking forward to the European Convention on Human Rights, for the appropriate way of protecting privacy: the focus of enquiry in both is the search for the legal justification for the publication.
And there are other drivers to the development of the law of privacy, particularly the social need and growing desire to control an unruly press. 84 There is, for example, much to be gained by expanding and adapting the 'responsible journalism' defence from the law of defamation 85 as a useful way of balancing privacy and free speech. 86 The concept of publication in the public interest 87 might also lend itself as a defence to an action based on an otherwise unjustifable infringement of personal privacy, by providing legal justification. It is true that, in Scotland, that concept never caught on as a defence in the law of defamation 88 when truthful allegations were at issue, 89 but the policy considerations are so different when dealing with privacy that I think that there is some attraction in developing a public interest defence. In other words, existing notions of public interest, responsible journalism and a whole jurisprudence from the European Court are likely to act as drivers to the developing law of privacy, building upon the protection that iniuria affords to the individual's feelings.
Conclusion
If the above analysis is correct, then the actio iniuriarum is certainly more than a romantic Romanism in Scots law, in that it serves to identify emotional hurt as a loss worthy, in some limited circumstances, of monetary redress by way of solatium. However, the law's general resistence to regarding emotional hurt as a loss is sound, and the identification of the circumstances in which that redress is justified is and should be driven by other forces than the ghosts of the past. A combination of the European Convention on Human Rights and domestic developments in the control of unbridled journalism (which we are likely to see more of) may well be the way of the future. Freedom from affront is no longer seen as a fundamental human interest.
Privacy, on the other hand, is a fundamental human interest, like liberty, with which it has in common that it is an essential pre-condition for the development of our personality and talents: that is why we protect it. How protection of privacy develops will depend upon the modern imperatives of our contemporary society and not upon the extent to which it can be accommodated in our old law. 87 Which is the test in some jurisdictions: see for example Jonathan Burchell, 'Personality Rights in South Africa: Re-affirming Dignity', in Personality Rights in Scotland, (n 10), chap. 6. 88 Bankton has not been followed when he said that truth is a defence to verbal injury (that is to say, not limited to defamation) 'if it concerned the good of the commonwealth to have the crime known, and is not said with design of reproach, otherwise the general rule is veritas convitii non excusat a calumnia': 1, 10, 31 (citing Voet).
